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Introduction 
 
There are significant similarities between Bosanquet’s ethical function of the state and 
Miller’s defence of nations as communities generating duties. Bosanquet’s references 
to the state are predominantly to the nation state (1917a, p. 295), and Miller argued 
that there are good reasons for states and nations to coincide. Mote to the point, there 
are essential similarities in the reasons why these two thinkers believe in the ethical 
significance of the nation state. Many of their arguments in defence of the state or the 
nation, respectively, are based on the particularist nature of communities in principle 
and the nation state in particular. The state, for Bosanquet, has ethical significance 
because it embodies the general will and the latter can exist only in specific 
communities with shared experiences and established traditions. The general will is 
anchored in specific communities, institutions and practices and the state is ‘the 
largest body which possesses the unity of experience necessary for constituting a 
general will’ (Bosanquet, 1917a, p. 272). Miller’s commitment to particularist ethics 
is explicit. Particularism, for him, works on the assumption ‘that memberships and 
attachments in general have ethical significance.’ (Miller, 1999, p. 65) National 
membership, however, supersedes in ethical significance other memberships for two 
reasons: existence of public culture and national self-determination. Bosanquet’s 
general will and Miller’s public culture are examples of how particularities are 
constitutive of moral behaviour.  
 
Parallel to these obvious similarities, there is one obvious difference. Miller’s 
particularist reading of the ethical significance of nations leads us to the conclusion 
that our duties to our fellow countrymen surpass our duties to fellow humans in 
general. The boundaries to the ethical communities are by the same token boundaries 
to our duties. Bosanquet’s moral philosophy does not lead to this conclusion. 
Although his particularist reading of the state imbues state boundaries with some 
moral significance, these boundaries are not in any fundamental way boundaries to 
one’s duties.  
 
The paper explains why in spite of the obvious similarity of seeing morality in 
particularist terms, the two thinkers ultimately espouse different understandings of 
morality, moral agency and the scope of duty. I will start by examining the extent of 
their commonality in bringing morality, community and particularism together. 
Therefore the first two sections of the paper explain the particularist aspects of 
Bosanquet’s general will and Miller’s public culture. Section 3 turns to the universal 
aspects of these concepts – aspects that are explicit and fundamental for Bosanquet’s 
moral philosophy, but implicit and underplayed by Miller, not least due to his overt 
commitment to ethical particularism. The paper demonstrates that the different 
balance between the particular and universal aspects of the general will and the public 
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culture help reveal the two thinker’s different understanding of morality, moral 
agency and the scope of duty. 
 
The dynamic between particularity and universalism in moral philosophy and the 
ethics of the nation state could lead to rather significant and controversial policy 
recommendations. Vincent discusses a recent ‘gradual but marked shift’ in political 
theory away from ‘universalist forms of argument towards favouring communities 
and groups’, where the groups and communities are seen in particularist terms (2002, 
p. 1). He views this trend as disconcerting due to its potential threat to basic universal 
liberal values like commitment to human rights, for example. But is this trend 
illiberal? Miller, who can be seen not only as an exponent but a driver of this shift 
towards particularity, claims that he espouses ‘social liberalism’ (2007, pp 20-1). He 
believes in human rights but he argues that our duties towards others’ human rights 
vary according to our community membership. Human rights are moral concepts and 
ethics is community bound, therefore particularist. I share Vincent’s concerns with the 
unconditional association between ethics, community and particularity. Indeed some 
of these concerns seem to be already justified. Miller’s conclusion that our duties 
towards human rights vary depending on whether others are or are not fellow 
nationals can be rather disturbing to immigrants, members of cultural and national 
minorities and citizens of poor states who receive support from richer states. 
 
Against this background, Bosanquet’s balancing of particularity and universality is 
reassuring. It takes on board, or more precisely, anticipates, Miller’s strong arguments 
about community and particularity in ethics. But because of the other, arguably 
universal, aspects of his moral philosophy, he forecloses the possibility of seeing 
fellow nationals and foreigners in ethically different terms. 
 
1. Bosanquet’s general will and its particularity  
 
Bosanquet’s general will is a central concept of his moral and political philosophy. 
Through it he explains the nature of human agency, of moral agency and of the state. 
The general will is the organic link between the individual and the state. The 
individual’s ‘actual’ will, Bosanquet argues, is different from his ‘real’ will (1899, 
pp132-4). The real will, on analysis, is the general will and the latter is embodied in 
the state (1899, pp122-36). 
 
The real will contains the totality of our life purposes missing in the actual will. The 
latter is partial both because it focuses on isolated needs and because it takes account 
primarily of personal wants. The actual will does not harmonise the diversity of our 
desires and the discrepancy between the requirements of myself and others (1899, pp. 
133-4). It is the will ‘we exercise in the trivial routine of daily life’ and it is ‘narrow, 
arbitrary, self-contradicting’ (1899, p. 125). Our real will is the will that achieves the 
unity of our overall life intentions and the harmony between our good and the good of 
others. Therefore the real will is the general will: the will that succeeds in 
harmonizing the diversity of actual wills. 
 
But generality is only one aspect of the real/general will. The transformation from 
actual to real/general has a distinct qualitative dimension. Bosanquet embraces 
Rousseau’s distinction between the will of all and the general will as it captures ‘the 
contrast between a mere aggregate and an organic unity’ (1899, p. 129). Mere 
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aggregation of actual wills will not produce a general will but simply a will of all. The 
general will is possible only if we are able to transform the actual into the real will as 
these two are qualitatively different. ‘The reason why it is necessary to insist upon the 
distinction between true and apparent interest, universal and aggregate of particulars, 
General Will and Will of All, is just that a true interest generally requires some degree 
of energy or effort, perhaps of self-sacrifice; while the purely private or apparent 
interest, the interest of each of us in his routine frame of mind, is that by which many 
are always determined, and a whole community is only too likely to be guided.’ 
(1899, p. 130) The transition from actual to real will is not a mechanical but 
conscious, effort-based process of willing objects conducive to the common good. 
Only such transformed will can serve as a foundation of the general will (1899, p. 
134). This qualitative aspect of the general will – the understanding that to develop 
general will we have to act on our real, not our actual will, and thus live up to the 
requirements of the real will – will be referenced in section 3, where the universal 
aspect of the general will are discussed. 
 
When we come to the question about where exactly the general will is to be found, we 
will notice the difference between Rousseau and Bosanquet, and will start to 
appreciate the particularist aspects of Bosanquet’s general will. Rousseau famously 
denigrated representative democracy and claimed that the direct vote is the most 
appropriate expression of the general will (Rousseau, 1968, p. 141). Bosanquet did 
not share Rousseau’s concerns with democratic representation, nor considered the 
outcome of the vote to be the best manifestation of the general will (1917b, p 125; 
1927, p. 262; 1988, p. 132).
2
 The pertinent observation here is that institutions of 
democratic representation, as opposed to institutions of direct democracy, for 
Bosanquet are not deficient but rather efficient expression of the general will. For 
Rousseau, the general will is embodied either in the whole body politic, as opposed to 
its constituent political factions, or in the ‘Laws’ and interpreted through the 
‘Lawgiver’ (Rousseau, pp.80-88). Bosanquet agrees but for him the laws and ‘the 
process of interpretation that Rousseau ascribes to the legislator’ are only a few 
among many examples of how pubic institutions are expressive of the general will: 
‘the legislator is merely one of the organs of social spirit itself’ (1899, p. 134; p. 136). 
‘The habits and institutions of any community are, so to speak, the standing 
interpretation of all private wills which compose it, and it is thus possible to assign to 
the General Will an actual and concrete meaning as something different at once from 
every private will, and from the vote of any given assembly, and yet as something on 
the whole, for what both the one and the other necessarily aim at sustaining as the 
framework of their life.’ (1899, p. 136) It is not the direct vote only, and therefore, 
only the body politic (Rousseau, 1968, p. 61), that account for the formation of the 
general will. For Bosanquet all communities can carry the general will, even those 
that in Rousseau’s term would count as factions and carriers of corporate will, to the 
extent that they have developed a common stock of models of social interaction and 
public functions, shared understandings and moral norms, etc.  (see also Nicholson, 
1990, p. 215).  
 
The general will is particular in at least two related ways. It is particular because it is 
embodied in particular social institutions and is represented by a stock of moral norms 
and public roles. It is a reservoir of specific social achievements. It is also particular 
in the sense of being a product of particular communities, as only particular 
communities can produce this stock of norms and functions. It is this sense that allows 
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us to say that it works as a moral boundary. I will expand on both of these ways of 
being particular. 
 
In more abstract terms, the general will is ‘actual social spirit’ (1899, p. 136), ‘the 
whole living system of the communal mind’ (1917a, p. 289), ‘the whole assemblage 
of individual minds, considered as a working system, with parts corresponding to one 
another and producing as a result a certain life for all those parts themselves’ (1927, 
pp. 261-2). Practically, it is ‘the complex of social institutions’ (1899, p. 136), the 
‘corporations, associations, public bodies’ that function as a network of ‘public 
functions’, and in general of ‘things of the deepest concern for the community and not 
managed by individuals for private profit’ (1917b, p. 125). The general will resides in 
public institutions because these become repositories of moral norms, public 
functions, agreed regulations, shared knowledge. In this sense, the general will is 
concrete. Bosanquet even argues that it is more concrete than the private will: ‘the 
will of any particular person is abstract and fragmentary compared with the will of the 
state’ (1919, p.75). Our trivial and our more socially sophisticated desires will not 
come to fruition without the stock of knowledge and skills deposited in society as a 
whole. The private person’s will lacks substance unless it is ‘supplemented, 
reinforced and controlled by the co-operation of minds and wills which is the 
community’ (1919, pp. 75-76).  
 
As a reservoir of shared knowledge, norms and public functions the general will 
allows us to fulfil our ‘special vocation’ (1919, p. 75), or our social and moral 
intentions. Doing so is harder than pursuing personal objectives, as in public matters 
you could not follow only your personal convictions: ‘you must not enforce your own 
religion’ (1919, p. 76). Unless is there is a common stock of norms through which you 
could express your position, you will find yourself in difficulty at finding a socially 
workable solution: your only option will be to enforce ‘your own religion’ by, 
metaphorically speaking, resorting to ‘the Inquisition straight away, or perhaps civil 
war’ (1919, p. 76). The existence of a particular stock of agreed norms and procedures 
is expressly useful for the realisation of moral intentions. Therefore the general will is 
best represented by its functioning at the level of the state. At this level it is 
‘embodied in a system of rights’ (1899, p.215; see also 1917a, p. 271). 
 
The second way in which the general way is particular is related to the first: we can 
only develop a common stock of norms and social roles if we live in communities 
bound by time and space. This stock of shared values has to be built – it is not a 
given, but an achievement. It is based on collaboration over time. The general will can 
only be found in a ‘genuine community sharing a common sentiment and animated by 
a common tradition’ (1917a, p. 292). It would be logical then to argue that there 
should be some limitation to the size of the community where a functional interaction 
was expected to take place. For Bosanquet, it is the state that marks the size limit to 
this community: ‘the state will be for every group the largest body which possesses 
the unity of experience necessary for constituting a general will’ (1917a, p. 272). 
The two features that make particularity constitutive of the general will are the 
necessity of relatively settled moral norms or relatively established social practices, 
on the one hand,  and the existence of specific communities, that is, communities as 
defined by specific time and space, on the other. 
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What are the functions achieved by the particularity of the general will and what is 
their moral value? I would argue that the general will functions as a facilitator and 
amplifier
3
 of moral behaviour. The facilitating function is achieved by the fact that the 
general will gives us ready models of moral action: as was demonstrated in the 
explanation of the first way in which the general will was seen as particular. By being 
a reservoir of common knowledge, norms and public functions, the general will spares 
us the trouble of finding the efficient ways in which we could deliver our moral 
intentions: it carries a rich stock of these efficient ways and we could choose the most 
suitable one.  
 
The general will is also an amplifier of moral behaviour as membership in 
communities stimulates our desire to do good things for others. Bosanquet’s 
commentary on patriotism makes a clear point of demonstrating the mobilising power 
of communities, and particularly of the nation state. ‘Patriotism, we have said, is an 
immense natural force, a magical spell. It rests, I suppose mainly on three things: your 
family and kindred – the tie of blood – which extends to the nation as a whole; your 
home – the actual place and land with which you have ties of custom and affection; 
and, what includes these two and more, your whole power and means of acting upon 
the world – language, ideas, modes of life, social habits.’ (1917c, p. 3) Communities 
in principle, and the nation state in particular, are powerful moral motivators. 
Interestingly, however, it is in this essay, ‘The Teaching of Patriotism’, that 
Bosanquet comments that the ‘natural force’ of patriotism could go either way – it can 
be constructive and distractive, so we have to think more carefully about what turns 
patriotism into a positive force. Both the facilitating and the amplifying functions of 
the particularity of the general will have their moral limitations and these will be 
discussed in section 3. 
 
2. The ethical function of particularity for Miller; the concept of public 
culture 
 
For David Miller particularity is a central feature of ethical discourse. He discusses 
the ethics of nationality in the framework of ethical particularism. He views ethical 
particularism and ethical universalism as ‘two competing accounts of the structure of 
ethical thought’ (1995, p. 49). In this sense there is more to Miller’s ethical 
particularism than simply ‘particularity’. However examining the function of 
particularity in his theory of nationality in a similar manner we examined it in the 
context of Bosanquet’s political philosophy will reveal and explain many of its 
significant aspects.  
 
I will demonstrate first the logic according to which ethical particularists ascribe 
distinctive ethical significance to relationships or membership in communities (I will 
use these terms interchangeably), and second, the reasons national communities have 
yet more distinct ethical status. On the basis of Miller’s arguments I will comment on 
the particularist aspects of his ethics. That will prepare the ground for the following 
section where I will look into those elements that are not ‘particular’, but universal.  
 
Ethical particularism, as an account of the structure of ethical thought, differs from its 
counterpart ethical universalism on the grounds that the former derives ethical 
reasoning from the commitments of specific relationships, while the latter is premised 
on abstract rational principles (1995, p. 50). Miller, in agreement with the ethical 
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particularists, argues that the ethical universalist misunderstands moral agency on at 
least two accounts. Universalism ‘draws a sharp line between moral agency and 
personal identity on the one hand, and between moral agency and personal motivation 
on the other’ (1995, p. 57). So for Miller, ethics is particularist because it is premised 
on relationships not on abstract principles. More specifically, relationships are 
constitutive of ethics, because personal identity, inextricably linked to moral agency, 
is derived from membership of particular communities, and because relationships 
generate personal motivation for one to follow his or her duty. 
 
A major advantage of ethical particularism over ethical universalism is that the former 
takes into account the significance of moral motivation, while the latter commits ‘to 
abstract rationality that exceeds the capacities of ordinary human beings’ (1995. p. 
58). ‘For the mass of mankind’, according to ethical particularists and to Miller, 
‘ethical life must be a social institution whose principles must accommodate natural 
sentiments towards relatives, colleagues and so forth … ’ (1995, p. 58) For Miller, it 
is a fact that we have stronger feelings and more favourable disposition towards those 
with whom we are in a relationship. While ethical particularism accommodates this 
fact, ethical universalism bypasses it. Although aspects of Miller’s assessment leave 
the impression that both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages (1995, 
pp 64; 80), he is rather good in demonstrating that the key allegations against ethical 
particularism can be successfully rebutted. For example, it can be demonstrated that 
on analysis, the pluralistic nature of ethical particularism does not entail conservatism 
or incoherence. He can also demonstrate, contra popular allegations, ethical 
particularism is impartial. Let me review these in turn. 
 
Ethical particularism is inherently pluralistic as it does not establish any universal 
moral principles. The different relationships we belong to pose different ethical 
demands for us, ‘and there is no single overarching perspective from which we can 
rank or order these demands’ (1995, p. 53). This, Miller admits, may lead to either 
conservatism or incoherence. This is because such understanding of ethics sanctions 
existing moral practices on the one hand, and fails to give us definitive moral 
guidance, on the other (1995, p.56). However, neither of these is fully accurate. As we 
shall shortly see, the ethics of nationality, and public culture in particular, will resolve 
both of these issues. The deliberative aspects of public culture guard against extreme 
conservative tendencies, and its relatively resilient nature helps us find solutions to 
moral dilemmas. 
 
Another high profile critique of ethical particularism is that it cannot uphold 
impartiality. If one views special bonds between people as a morally desirable feature, 
how could one exercise impartiality of judgement? Miller’s observation that ethical 
particularism can successfully uphold impartiality, comes to show that all significant 
moral tasks can be trusted in the hands of ethical particularism. The reason an ethical 
particularist can be impartial is because impartiality consist in applying a rule even-
handedly in accordance to ‘ethically sanctioned rules and procedures’ (1995, p. 54). 
But rules and procedures have their contents constituted by specific relationships. In 
other words, once we come to see that moral norms are not universal but generated by 
relationships, we will understand why impartiality and ethical particularism are fully 
compatible. 
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When we turn to Miller’s ethics of nationality we can see at least two reasons why the 
moral bonds forged by membership in a nation outweigh other moral bonds: national 
identity and public culture. National identity has the unique capacity of ‘evoking 
fierce, and indeed often supreme, loyalty, manifested in people’s willingness to give 
up their lives for their community’ (1995, p. 68). This exceptional degree of 
commitment, however, is not necessarily matched by specific knowledge of what 
exactly we should do for our nation. Although we know reasonably well what to do 
for those who belong in our closer communities, we know little of our distant fellow 
compatriots. This gap in our knowledge is filled up by ‘a public culture’ which, 
among other things, ‘helps to fix responsibilities’ (1995, p. 68). On analysis that 
public culture fulfils a cluster of related functions not dissimilar to the functions of 
Bosanquet’s general will. I will look into three of its aspects. It is resilient; it is 
subject to political debate, so although resilient it is flexible; and it allows us to 
develop relations based on ‘loose reciprocity’ as opposed to relationships based 
merely on ‘strict reciprocity’ (1995, pp. 67-73). 
 
I will review these aspects of public culture in more detail in order to demonstrate the 
mechanisms through which national communities generate duties and to trace the 
place of particularity, and eventually of universality, in these mechanisms. 
 
Public culture represents ‘a set of ideas about the character of the community’ and it 
emerges as a result of joint experience and public debate. As such it has specific, 
fixed, contents which gives it certain ‘ideological coloration’ (1995, pp. 68-9). As 
public cultures embody specific moral norms, they are good in providing guidance 
about particular responsibilities people have. The contents of the norms embedded in 
the public culture are both resilient and flexible. They are subject to interpretation and 
influenced by political debate, but they are also sediments from previous political 
debates and thus resilient to quick changes. This resilience has its virtues as it limits 
the power of governments. The public culture serves as a reservoir of justifications 
that allows one to resist the powers that be. The flexibility of public culture, that is, 
the fact that it is shaped up by public deliberation, is also a very commendable 
feature. It allows defenders of the ethics of nationality, like Miller himself, to resist 
the standard accusation that ethical particularism is inherently conservative as it 
sanctifies traditional practices. Once we understand that public culture ‘results from 
rational deliberation over time about what it is to belong to the nation in question’, 
i.e., that it is significantly impacted by the process of political debate, we will see that 
the ethics of nationality has its mechanism of advancing moral reform (1995, p.70).   
 
The third aspect of public culture I would like to discuss here is its ability to foster 
loose reciprocity over and above strict reciprocity. Miller develops this observation by 
comparing obligations of nationality with obligations of citizenship. The obligations 
of citizenship are discharged through the state. The state secures for its citizens rights 
of personal protection and welfare rights while, in return, citizens have the obligation 
to keep the law, pay their taxes and uphold the welfare schemes. Because of the 
formal nature of the state, the obligations of citizenship are guaranteed – where 
citizens fail to live up to their duties, the state will force them to do so. Where nation 
and state coincide, the obligations of nationality are discharged through the state. 
 
However, obligations of nationality are not superseded, or made redundant, by the 
efficiency of the state to discharge obligations of citizenship. Obligations of 
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nationality have an element lacking in obligations of citizenship. The latter are 
premised on strict reciprocity. Citizen are motivated by the ‘principle of fairness’ 
which implies that ‘each would expect to benefit from their association in proportion 
to his or her contribution’ (1995, pp. 71-2). This is not the case with obligations of 
nationality. The bonds of nationality motivate people to offer aid even in 
circumstances where no reciprocal benefit can be afforded. The membership in the 
community gives one assurance that one’s positive contribution, even when not 
immediately repaid, will be appreciated and will serve a common purpose. Thus even 
if strict reciprocation is not the case, one’s service to others would never be a pure 
loss. By making a contribution one is ‘helping to sustain a set of relationships from 
which he stands to benefit to some degree’ (1995, p. 67). Without obligations of 
nationality, Millar argues, the obligations of citizenship will not be able to carry us 
beyond strict reciprocity. The distinct ethical virtue of nationality is its capacity to 
foster loose reciprocity. 
 
Having discussed Miller’s ethics of nationality and its key ingredient, public culture, I 
would like to comment on how exactly his ethical particularism is particular. It is 
particular in a very similar way to Bosanquet’s general will. The stock of moral 
norms, values, rules and practices is particular. Also the communities within which 
these norms, values, rules and practices evolve over time are particular. The two 
moral functions fulfilled by the particularist aspects of Bosanquet’s general will are 
also fulfilled by Miller’s public culture: it amplifies and facilitates moral behaviour. 
The existing shared norms and values carried by the public culture stimulate our 
moral action. We are likely to do more good things for people with whom we share 
public culture. Also this existing stock of moral norms, rules and procedures help us 
make difficult moral decisions – either by giving us tried and tested paths for action or 
by offering useful procedures through which to find answers to hard moral questions.   
 
3. The universalist aspects of the general will and public culture 
 
There are at least three ways in which Bosanquet’s theory of the state and the general 
will entail commitment to universal principles. Firstly, the general will has to be 
tested against the quality of the values it helps deliver: a consideration well developed 
in his understanding of patriotism, but also deeply embedded in his basic theory of the 
general will. Secondly the ‘adjudicatory’ capacity of the general will, that is, its 
capacity to be an ultimate arbiter in cases of moral conflict, represents in essence a 
universalising as opposed to a particularising tendency. Thirdly, Bosanquet’s moral 
theory allocated a significant if not central place to moral aspirations, or what he 
would often call ‘moral spirit’. The moral aspirations or the moral spirit are a 
permanent underlying factor of morality in general, even if they only come to fruition 
though the clothing of the particular moral norms, rules, practices and social 
institutions. As such they are universal. On analysis, Miller’s public culture also has 
universal elements. These include its capacity to foster loose reciprocity and deliver 
impartiality, and its deliberative nature. The ascription of exclusive ethical value to 
nationality, also presupposed some universal moral standard. However, Miller’s 
understanding of morality does not contain an equivalent to Bosanquet’s moral 
aspirations or moral spirit. I will look at the above mentioned universalising aspects of 
the general will and public culture in turn. 
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Bosanquet’s belief in the ethical nature of the state is well demonstrated in his book 
The Philosophical Theory of the State and his essays ‘The Teaching of Patriotism’, 
‘The Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind’, and ‘Patriotism in the 
Perfect State’. The ethical nature of the state is derived from the ethical nature of the 
general will. Bosanquet most definitive defence of the state is based on the claim that 
‘the community which organises itself as a state will be for every group the largest 
body which possesses the unity of experience necessary for constituting  general will’ 
(1917a, p. 272).  
 
Bosanquet’s association between the general will and the state helps reinforce the 
particularist dimension of the general will – its reliance on being anchored in a 
specific community that endures and develops over time, and its dependence on 
people sharing ‘same mind and feeling’ (1917c, p. 3, 1917a, p. 271). However, 
Bosanquet’s discussion of the nature of patriotism brings us very quickly to the more 
universal aspects of the general will. His thoughts on patriotism demonstrate that the 
national fellow feeling is a positive force only if it is premised on the right values. 
‘No patriotism or no politics are trustworthy unless they are kept sweet and clean by a 
real fundamental love for the things that are not diminished by being shared – such as 
kindness, beauty and truth.’ (1917c, p.12) Therefore the ethical significance of the 
state is not derived merely from the existence of specific national community, but 
from the quality of the values it helps us foster. One of the arguments here is that 
specific communities tend to inspire the opposite sets of commitments: towards 
objects that are divisive and generating hostility, on the one hand, and towards values 
that help overcome conflict and generate more welfare for all. For example, the 
family is seen as ‘the root of all selfishness and narrowness and jobbery’, one the one 
hand, but also as ‘the root of all morality and civilisation’ (1917c, pp. 4-5). In a 
similar manner patriotism could be either ‘a source brainless and often fraudulent 
clamour, or at best a dangerous fanaticism’, or ‘a daily and sober loyalty, which 
recognises the root of our moral being in the citizen spirit and citizen duty … and a 
love of our country as an instrument and embodiment of truth, beauty and kindness’ 
(1917c, pp 3, 16). The particular community as such can generate both good and bad 
will, and what helps us distinguish the first from the second is a principle of some 
universal nature. 
 
This intrinsic orientation of the general will towards objects of value can also be seen 
in Bosanquet’s argument in favour of the nation state over and above mankind in 
general. His claim is that unlike humankind, which is nothing else but mere 
aggregation of all people, the nation state nurtures a framework within which people 
lead valuable lives. He introduces a dichotomy between ‘quality’ and ‘crowd’, where 
quality is embodied in the nation state due to its capacity to foster ‘values which 
govern our aspirations to the best life’ (1917a, p. 291) and the crowd represents the 
non-communal nature of humankind and therefore the nonexistence of quality.
4
 This 
connects well with Bosanquet’s understanding of the general will as distinct from the 
will of all, discussed in section 1. It is not the mere aggregation of human wills that 
produces what is special in the general will. The general will is an outcome of 
transformation of the actual will into real will. It is not the lowest common 
denominator of our aggregate desires, but a qualitatively different formation which 
overcomes the shortcomings of the actual will. Unlike the actual will, the general will 
is directed towards unity, overcoming of conflict and cultivation of virtue. One way in 
which we can understand the specific contents of what Bosanquet sees as valuable or 
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representation of ‘best life’ is to see it as a form of overcoming feelings and 
tendencies that separate us or inflate conflict. We can understand the values and ideals 
of the general will as ‘an antidote to fanaticism and partisan bias and blind self-
deception, all of which moods are disastrous in great affairs’ (1917c, p. 16). 
 
Interestingly, while the nation state has significant ethical advantages compared to 
humankind as a mechanical aggregation of people, there are communities and 
organisations that have ethical advantages over the nation state. Sometimes the state 
falls on the wrong side of the quality divide. For example, Bosanquet distinguishes 
between ‘political’ and ‘social’, or between political in the ‘narrower’ and ‘wider’ 
sense, where the first has to do with ‘the governmental machine’ or matters on which 
‘the party machinery has to be applied’ and the second is related to ‘things of the 
deepest concern for the community and not managed by individuals for private profit, 
but by corporations, associations, public bodies, as we call them, of all possible kinds, 
ancient and modern’ (1917b, p. 125; see also Simhony, 2013). The moral value of a 
community is related to its success in fostering activities which promote worthy 
values. 
 
In the context of the state, the general will has an additional universalising function. 
As we know, for Bosanquet, the general will does not belong exclusively to the state. 
Any community that has achieved a degree of unity and thus helps its members to 
achieve the ideals of ‘best life’ possesses general will. ‘Where two or three are 
gathered together with any degree of common experience, there is pro tanto a general 
will.’ (1899, p. 18) However, there are two ways in which the state has an ‘absolute’ 
character, and the second is rather pertinent with respect to the general will. The state 
is absolute, first because it is a coercive institution of highest order and second 
because of its function of an ultimate adjudicator (1917a, pp 273-4; 1899, pp 181-2). 
These two functions are related, as the second offers legitimation of the first. It is the 
state’s role of ‘ultimate arbiter and regulator’ which gives it ‘the right to exercise 
force in the last resort’ and thus makes it ‘a unit lawfully exercising force’ (1899, p. 
181). What is of interest to us is the adjudicatory function of the general will in the 
context of the state – its capacity for ‘ultimate and effective adjustment of the claims 
of individuals, and of the various social groups in which the individuals are involved’ 
(1899, p. 181). Adjudicatory function is universalising in nature. Its objective is not to 
forward particular moral norms and social practices but to resolve conflicts between 
these when they arise. In the context of adjudication, the specific character of 
communal rules and practices is not being affirmed but temporarily suspended in the 
name of a solution acceptable across community borders.  
 
Finally, I will look at the idea of moral aspirations that are part and parcel of 
Bosanquet’s general will. It could be one of the best illustrations of how the 
universality and particularity of the general will are intertwined. In several essays 
Bosanquet argues that the state and the general will do not threaten individual 
freedom, but are, on analysis, fundamentally indispensable even when it comes to 
matters of private conscience and political dissent (1919, 1917a). He develops this 
argument in reply to anti-idealist critiques to which his philosophical theory of the 
state has been subjected after the First World War. His opponents would claim that 
the state is a source of ‘war, exploitation within and without, class privilege, arbitrary 
authority, discontent directing ambitions to foreign conquest and to jealousy of other 
states’ (1917a, p. 276). Also strong social institutions and a strong state in particular, 
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threaten individual freedom (Hobhouse, 1918, pp 44-70). Therefore the power of the 
state, according to them, should be weakened not strengthened. Bosanquet’s reply is 
that any moral perspective, even the anti-establishment ones, are shaped and 
expressed through social structures. ‘The rebel draws his matter and suggestion from 
the co-operating minds.’ (1919, p.76) A stronger state with a functional general will 
would be the best environment to channel moral ideas, be they for or against the 
establishment. ‘The remedy for disorganisation is not less organisation, but more.’ 
(1917a, p. 281) What is of interest to us in this debate is that Bosanquet and his 
opponents share a common premise: the importance of moral aspirations. While his 
opponents believe that the state suppresses them, he argues that the state, due to its 
possession of general will, is crucial for their realisation.   
 
Another way in which we could demonstrate the nature of moral aspirations will be 
through Bosanquet’s argument behind the claim that the state is ‘the guardian of a 
whole moral world, but does not itself act in a moral world’ (1917a, p. 288) – a claim 
to which we will also return in section 4. Here Bosanquet wants to explain the 
difference between the moral task of the private person and that of the state. The idea 
is that the state, through the general will, functions as the framework within which 
individuals’ moral spirit can find expression. There is no equivalent framework which 
will allow the state to express its moral agency. There is no recognised moral order 
with the characteristics of the general will that exists beyond the state. Therefore the 
genuine moral world is that within, not without the nation state. In this context 
Bosanquet discusses the nature of morality and I believe this discussion throws light 
on the interplay of universality and particularity. Bosanquet argues that there is ‘no 
such thing in ethics as an absolute rule or an absolute obligation, unless it were that of 
so far as possible realising the best life’ (1917a, p. 285). There is no absolute rule, but 
there is an underlying principle. ‘Every situation is in some degree, however slightly, 
new; and his moral duty is to be equal to it, to deal with it, to mould it ….’ What is it 
that steers us in this uncertainty? One ‘moulds’ his situation ‘in accordance with the 
moral spirit which is in him, into contribution to the realisation of best life’ (1917a, p. 
285, emphasis added). So the universal dimension in Bosanquet’s understanding of 
morality is not to be found in rational moral rules – which is how Miller reads ethical 
universalism (1995, p. 50) – but in the moral spirit which the general will helps 
deliver. And here we can see one more reason for the indispensability of the general 
will: precisely because there are no absolute moral rules, the reservoir of norms and 
practices carried by the general will turns out invaluable. But this reservoir is never 
full to capacity: ‘the private individual has still in principle a new morality constantly 
to create’ (1917a, p. 286). The moral aspirations are universal but they need to be 
delivered in the particular clothing of the existing repository of moral norms, rules 
and practices. We can argue that this incompleteness of the repository is an indication 
that, ultimately, the diving force of morality is the moral spirit. This does not diminish 
the significance of the general will as it aims to reflect the moral action fully. The 
‘true general will’ is not ‘a mere external convention’ (1899, p. 150). One of the 
messages here is that the state is the universe of moral action, therefore it cannot be 
easily understood as a moral agent itself. The state, and its general will, put all 
elements of moral action together – the moral spirit of the individuals and the socials 
norms, rules, knowledge and practices that allow this spirit to come to practical 
fruition. Morality ‘is a systematic structure, such as to bring home its universal 
demand in a particular and appropriate form to every moral being according to its 
conditions’ (1917a, p. 285, emphasis added). 
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Having seen the three ways in which Bosanquet’s general will is universal, we can 
turn to Miller and tease out the universal aspects of his understanding of loose 
reciprocity, impartiality and deliberation. Thus, it will be demonstrated that the 
concept of public culture, in a similar manner to the concept of general will, combines 
particularity with universality. It will be commented at the end of the section, 
however, that Millers moral theory holds no equivalent to Bosanquet’s moral 
aspirations. This could throw some light on why the two thinkers see the limits of our 
duty in a different fashion. 
 
As our discussion in the previous section demonstrated, loose reciprocity reflects our 
preparedness to do things for others even if the prospects for equivalent reciprocation 
of our good deed are not there. Communities stimulate actions of good will, because 
even if strict reciprocation is not an option, there will nevertheless be a ‘loose’ one – 
we stand to benefit either in another way, or in the long term. The principle behind 
loose reciprocity, however, is the same as the principle behind moral action: 
preparedness to suspend the pursuit of personal goals, in the name of common goals. 
Choosing to give without immediate reciprocation is a form of moral action because 
one has decided to act for the welfare of the others. Miller’s argument in favour of the 
ethical significance of the community is that membership in a community reconciles 
the tension between ‘private aims’ and ‘obligations’. In the community ‘I see my own 
welfare as bound up with the community to which I belong’ therefore ‘contributing 
towards it is also a form of goal fulfilment’ (1995, pp 66-7). In this context, Miller 
claims that while universalist ethics sees an endemic tension between personal goals 
and public good, the particularist ethics reconciles these. But his argument does not 
demonstrate a fundamentally different understanding of morality to that of the 
universalists. Morality seen as a commitment to the common good is a shared premise 
for both parties. Even the conflict between personal goals and public good is a shared 
premise, otherwise Miller’s argument that community enhances moral motivation will 
not work. The reason we should ascribe ethical significance to communities is that 
they are excellent reconciliators of the tension between private and public values. If 
this tension was not assumed in the first place, the motivational power of the 
community would lose its objective.  
 
Miller’s argument that ethical particularism upholds impartiality cannot be sustained 
on a purely particularist ground as well. His claim there, as discussed in section 2, is 
that the rules which we impartially uphold are particular in nature. However, even if 
the particularity of the rule stays in place, the particularity of relationships has to be 
suspended. When I apply a rule impartially, I abstract myself from the particular 
relationships I am in. In other words, some particularities stay in place but others do 
not. More to the point, the very particularity that is suspended in the context of 
impartiality - that of relationships – is one with vital significance for Miller’s theory 
of the ethical nature of communities. So impartiality can be upheld by ethical 
particularism but at the cost of giving up a very significant ingredient of its 
constitution. An ethical particularist could hold on rather firmly to the particularity of 
rules and argue that these are premised on relationships: thus relationships will still 
retain ethical significance. But the fact that the more immediate relationships – those 
to which the impartial judge belongs – have to be put aside, means that ethical 
particularism has to make a significant concession to its universalist counterpart.  
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The deliberative character of public culture is another aspect that puts limits to 
particularity. If ethical particularism is defined through its defence of public culture, 
its opponents, Miller claims, could not criticise it on the grounds of being a sanctifier 
of ‘merely traditional ethical relations’ (1995, p. 70). Processes of rational 
deliberation and political debate help adjust the different rules and values of the 
smaller communities, as a result of which ‘ethical relations’ do not stay the same but 
change. Deliberation and debate have a universalising tendency as they aim to 
harmonise conflicting particularities. Even though the resulting product, that is, public 
culture in a particular point in time, is also particular, the process of its creating 
entails overcoming irreconcilable differences. In this context, Miller’s claim that 
‘people greatly value living under their own rules and according to their own cultural 
beliefs’ (2007, p.21) has to be counterbalanced against the demands for rational 
deliberation and political compromise that stem from public culture. It also has to be 
counterbalanced by the equally valid observation that people value living in a just 
society where the diversity of rules and cultures is a pertinent factor of almost any 
national community. 
 
Miller’s defence of the distinct ethical significance of the nation state also betrays 
universalist underpinning. The fact that the ethical significance of some communities 
surpasses that of others, not only undermines the pluralistic nature of ethical 
particularism
5
, but draws a comparison that can work only against a universal 
standard. 
 
Finally, we can address the issue about whether Miller’s ethics gives us an equivalent 
to Bosanquet’s moral aspirations. The negative answer to this question could offer 
some of the explanation of the different approaches Bosanquet and Miller have to the 
limits to our duty as imposed by communities. Put in figurative terms, Bosanquet’s 
morality covers a lager domain than Miller’s. While, for Miller, morality builds on 
duties, for Bosanquet, it builds on moral aspirations and duties, and if anything, duties 
are an outgrowth of moral aspirations. We could judge the scope of Miller’s moral 
sphere from his recommendation ‘always to see human beings as patients and agents: 
needy and vulnerable creatures who cannot survive without the help of others, but at 
the same time as people who can make choices and take responsibility for their lives’ 
(2007, p. 21). Seeing the domain of morality as stretched by two opposing parameters, 
an agent and a patient, I find coherent with Bosanquet’s morality (Dimova-Cookson, 
2011, pp 60-62). But I would draw attention to the nature of agency envisaged here. 
There is a puzzling lack of symmetry between Miller’s agent and the patient. The 
patient is the recipient of care, while the agent provides care for herself. A more 
symmetrical relationship would portray the agent as a provider of care for the patient, 
as opposed to a merely self-sufficient person. A Bosanquetian framework would 
definitely envisage the agent as a provider of service for others. So while for Miller 
the moral spectrum stretches between self-sufficient people on the one hand and 
dependent people on the other, for Bosanquet it stretches between those who provide 
for others and those who receive this provision. As I said, the difference here is in the 
understanding of moral agency. Bosanquet’s moral agent is not simply self-reliant but 
outward oriented. Moral action allows her to fulfil her moral aspirations. Thus moral 
action is gratifying for the patient and the agent. For Miller morality and moral 
agency are based on duty – duty to care after oneself and others. But there is no 
obvious motivation stemming from the agent himself. Not surprisingly, for him 
relationships and social institutions are vital, if not exclusive, providers of moral 
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motivation. For Bosanquet moral aspiration functions as a spring of motivation and 
this is a source of motivation that exists over and above that generated by social 
networks. In other words, in the context of Bosanquet’s moral theory, motivation 
springs not only from the particular, but also from the universal aspects of the general 
will. 
 
4. Are there boundaries to duty? 
 
The ethical particularism espoused by Miller entails boundaries to our duties. As 
ethics derives its contents from membership in particular communities, the borders of 
these communities translate as limits to our duties. Our duties towards our fellow 
countrymen, for example, surpass those towards foreigners. Despite the fact the 
Bosanquet shares many of Miller’s considerations about the different moral logic of 
the relationships that operate within and without the state, the British idealist does not 
advance a conclusion about community based limits to our duties. I will examine 
Miller’s reasoning behind seeing the national and international orders in different 
moral lights. This reasoning is revealed in his distinction between social and global 
justice. I will then re-visit Bosanquet’s assessment of the different moral tasks of the 
person and of the state, as this assessment mirrors well some of the logic of Miller’s 
distinction. I will then argue that even if Bosanquet’s ideas imply certain boundaries 
to our duties, these boundaries are contingent and not necessary. Moral relations 
between members of different states are for both thinkers possible, but for Bosanquet 
they are also desirable.  
 
Miller’s ethics of nationality underpins his distinction between social and global 
justice. While social justice operates within the state, global justice is related to the 
international order. As these two justices function within different communities, their 
moral principles could not be identical. Social justice is practiced among ‘citizens of 
the same political community’ and it is ‘a matter of establishing the conditions under 
which they can continue to act as free and equal citizens: it includes, for instance, a 
range of rights such as freedom of expression and the right to vote that define the 
status of citizen, as well as rights to material resources (such as a minimal income) 
that enable people to function effectively as citizens in a political sense’ (2007, p. 15). 
What characterises the sphere of social justice is the existence of a complex and 
intricate social infrastructure that needs to be in place so that things like rights 
protection, resource redistribution and democratic participation are made possible. No 
such complexity and intricacy can be observed at the level of global justice. If there 
are any social institutions at global level that protect rights, redistribute resources and 
have democratic constitution, they are considerably less effective in performing these 
functions. People are already constituted as citizens within the parameters of the state, 
that is, within the framework of social justice, so the tasks of global justice, whatever 
they are, are not of the same political nature. This takes us to a significant difference 
between social and global justice. The fact that people enter the sphere of global 
justice as accomplished citizens implies a different moral agenda. In a global context, 
people relate to each other ‘as citizens of independent national communities, where 
each citizen body has a collective interest in determining the future of its own 
community’ (2007, p. 15). While in the framework of social justice we related to each 
other from the premises of our shared interest to help each other become citizens, in 
the framework of global justice we aim, among other things, to protect the 
achievement of our citizenship. In other words, we do not have the same moral 
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interactions with members of other political communities. Miller takes this 
observation a step further. Attempting to have the same moral interactions, that is, to 
protect rights, share resources and democratically deliberate with foreigners in the 
same way as with fellow nationals is not only difficult, but undesirable. Such moral 
outreach will be ill-advised, as in addition the practical hurdles to our good intentions, 
we will be doing something wrong. We will be undermining the other citizens’ 
political self-determination (1995, p. 77; 2007, p. 19).  
 
So the limits to our duties are both contingent and morally desirable. They are 
contingent, because as a matter of fact, the state puts boundaries on social justice. 
Institutions that foster social justice tend to operate at state level. We could view this 
as a contingent limitation as we can imagine that these institutions enlarge their remit 
and thus expand the numbers of people who acquire citizenship under them. Miller 
even suggests, that ‘we can imagine a course of political change that leads eventually 
to a world state within which human being everywhere would indeed relate to one 
another as equal citizens’ (2007, pp 15-16). This would be a difficult and time costly 
project, but not an impossible one. 
 
But the limits to our duties are also morally desirable. Thinking of social and global 
justice in separate terms, and in this vein, thinking of our duties to fellow nationals as 
more extensive than our duties to foreigners, is desirable because it is morally good to 
protect state autonomy. It is good to uphold the ethical significance of the national 
borders. It is not only that ‘ironing out differences between nations would be 
unfeasible or involve high levels of coercion’, but that people ‘want to be in control of 
their own destiny, and fiercely resent it when outsiders try to interfere, even with 
benevolent intentions’ (2007, pp 21; 264). Moral outreach will trespass on national 
self-determination and affect adversely the citizen, and implicitly moral, constitution 
of foreigners. 
 
As I discussed in section 3, Bosanquet’s distinction between ‘the moral position of the 
private individual’ and that of the state is very important, because the first of these is 
the paradigmatic moral world and gives us plenty of insights into Bosanquet’s 
understanding of morality in principle (1915, p. 137). The distinction between these 
two worlds – ‘of morals and of international politics’ (1915, p. 371) - is also of 
interest as it parallels Miller’s distinction between social and global justice. The moral 
world of the private person is the state, and is thus equivalent to social justice, while 
the moral world of the state is that of international politics and is thus equivalent of 
global justice. Bosanquet’s commentary about the difference between these is similar 
to Miller’s in several ways. First of all, the state is the paradigmatic moral universe 
and the task of the international community is to protect the ‘morals’ as achieved by 
the state, not to replicate it in its own rights. ‘The immediate task of morals is to live a 
life, that of international politics to provide a world within which life can be lived.’ 
(1915, p.137) The state is ‘the ark which carries our treasure’ (1915, p.135). In other 
words, the state has a distinct ethical significance: significance as marked against that 
of the international community. The virtues we cultivate ‘at home’ will make us good 
international citizens – a message that tallies well with Miller’s vision of ‘national 
responsibility as a vehicle of global justice’ (2007, p. 269.). Secondly, because of its 
distinguished moral status, the state has a certain inward orientation. Its pursuit of 
‘might’ through means of war is legitimate (1915, pp 135-6). The duty of the state 
towards its citizens will outweigh its duty towards citizens of other states. This, 
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however, does not mean that the duties of individuals towards compatriots outweigh 
their duties towards foreigners.  
 
Why is that the case? Why, in view of the similarities between Miller’s and 
Bosanquet’s approaches to the ethics of the nation state and ethics of international 
relation, would we argue that Bosanquet does not see state borders as boundaries to 
our duties as well? 
 
First, the fact that ‘the nature of private morality’ is superior to that of ‘international 
politics’ (1915, p. 150) carries implications which Miller does not, but Bosanquet 
does pursue. What states are allowed to do in pursuits of might is not the same as 
what individuals are expected or allowed to do in moral terms. The state can be 
inwardly oriented, but not individuals. The very nature of the morality which the state 
harbours varies for the two thinkers. For Miller, morality is the framework within 
which duties find concrete expression. For Bosanquet, it is the framework within 
which individuals’ moral aspirations find concrete expression, either as duties or as 
service. As we discussed in the previous section, moral aspirations play a central role 
in the workings of morality and the general will, and this makes a difference with 
respect to the moral horizon individuals have. The Bosanquetian moral horizon is 
outwardly expanding: its limitation by particular parameters of the general will is 
contingent, not necessary. 
 
Second, the morality harboured by the state is outward not only in format but in 
contents. The ethical value of the nation state, for Bosanquet, is not unconditional. It 
is true that only the general will can account for moral action and the general will is 
associated with the state, which makes the state ethically indispensable. But the 
contents of the values that the national community fosters determine its ethical 
legitimacy (see section 3). The moral values of the state have to be outward oriented, 
inclusive of those outside, mindful of the wellbeing of all. ‘The moral view of the 
world which you and your state stand up for is one thing. A moral view which 
considers only your own and your state’s immediate interest is quite another thing….’ 
(1915, p. 134, emphasis added). The latter will not be ethically legitimate. The inward 
orientation of the state is justified on the grounds of protecting morality as an ultimate 
human achievement, but the contents of this morality demands an outward attitude. 
States are allowed to protect their state borders in order to preserve the general will 
and the moral practices associated with it. But the purpose of morality is to foster best 
life, to create things that are not diminished by sharing (Bosanquet, 1917c, p. 12).  
 
One way to resolve this tension would be to differentiate between the duties of the 
states and duties of individuals. The state can make certain decisions in favour of its 
citizens, but there is reason in principle why individual should distinguish between 
compatriots and foreigners in the context of their ethical reasoning. There are 
contingent reasons. The lack of shared general will is likely to diminish the 
possibilities to express or deliver effectively one’s moral intentions. It is also likely to 
diminish our moral motivation. But these are contingent, not necessary limitations to 
the scope of our duty.   
 
Conclusion 
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The paper discusses the balance between particularity and universality in Bosanquet’s 
concept of the general will and Miller’s concept of pubic culture. Both thinkers give 
us grounds to believe that morality has significant particular dimensions displayed in 
the specific nature or moral norms, practices and social institutions, and in the time 
and place bound nature of communities. However, on analysis, the general will and 
the public culture have universal aspects found in the commitment to permanent 
values, the unifying and conflict overcoming tendencies and the nature of moral 
aspirations in the case of Bosanquet, and in the vision of morality as contribution to 
others’ wellbeing, the commitment to impartiality, and the endorsement of  public 
deliberation as means of overcoming conflicts in the case of Miller. While with 
Bosanquet the balance between universality and particularity is explicit, with Miller, 
who officially extols the virtues of ethical particularism, the universal dimensions are 
underplayed and mostly implicit. They are also less, due to the lack of an equivalent 
to moral aspirations in his moral theory. The different degree and nature of the two 
thinkers’ universalism is reflected in their different vision of morality and moral 
agency which helps explain one significant difference between them: their assessment 
of the community based limits to the scope of duty. While for Bosanquet these limits 
are merely contingent, for Miller they are morally desirable as well. 
                                                 
1
 I am very grateful for the support and feedback of Avital Simhony, Peter Nicholson 
and Andrew Vincent. 
2
 This difference, however, demonstrates Bosanquet’s insistence on the will 
transformative aspect implied in the emergence of the general will. 
3
 For a discussion about how relationships have an amplifying effect on moral action 
see also Goodin (2008). 
4
 ‘Whether humanity can yet be said to have a general will is at least doubtful.’ 
(Bosanquet, 1927, p. 266) 
5
 According to Miller, ethical particularists are committed to pluralism, that is, the 
belief that there is no single overarching perspective from which we can rank the 
moral demands of various relationships (1995, p. 53).  
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